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Locked Up They Won’t Let Me Out: Giving Prisoners the Right to Die with Dignity in 
Oregon 
 
On November 4, 1994, voters in Oregon elected to pass Measure 16, Oregon Death with 
Dignity (“Dignity Act”), making it the first state in the country1 to legalize physician-assisted 
suicide.2 The future of Oregon’s Dignity Act would be uncertain until a few years later because 
of the many legal delays provoked by the controversy of legalizing physician-assisted suicide.3 
Physician-assisted suicide goes by many other names such as: aid in dying, right to die, end of 
life, and death with dignity. Oregon opted for the latter. Death with dignity has gained some 
steam as of recent.4 Even though more states have passed such legislation, the debate on 
physician-assisted suicide continues to spark heated discussion.5  
Nonetheless, some seek expansion of this new end-of-life option, including certain 
segments of our incarcerated population.  While prisoners lose some rights when they are 
convicted, the question always persists as to the scope of rights they should retain.  Those in 
 
1 See David Brown, Assisted Suicide Law Splits Oregon Doctors: Tough Rules Limit Use of Lethal Doses, CHI. 
SuN-TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at 22 ('[E]nactment ... of Oregon's 'Death with Dignity Act' represents a legal 
acceptance of physician-assisted suicide that is without precedent in the United States."). 
2 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.800. 
3 Oregon Death with Dignity Act: A History - Physician-Assisted Death Oregon 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/oregon-death-with-dignity-act-history/  
4 The other eight states with end of life statutes are California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, 
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. How to Access and Use Death with Dignity Laws, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https:// www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/access/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2019). California and Colorado also have the 
death penalty with 732 and three inmates on death row respectively, however they currently have a gubernatorial 
moratorium on executions. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-rowyear?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2019). District of Columbia, Hawaii, Vermont and Washington abolished the death penalty between the 
years 1972 and 2018. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 2, 2019).  
5 See Brown, supra note 8, at 22 and accompanying text; Carey Goldberg, Oregon Braces for New Right-to-Die 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at A12 ("Oregon may become again, and with greater intensity, the principal 
arena in which the thorny ethical questions surrounding [physician-assisted suicide] are translated into a knock-
down, drag-out political battle."). 
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prison should be able to make the same choice when it comes to being able to die with dignity. 
This will aid in maintaining the prison population as well.  
The Supreme Court of the United States is silent on its ruling on access 
to aid in dying in prison. Due to the absence of binding precedent, our dialogue on the 
constitutionality of aid in dying in prisons is informed by how courts have treated withdrawal of 
medical technology and do not resuscitate orders, and how the Supreme Court has ruled 
on aid in dying.  
This paper will examine the Dignity Act in Oregon and how to apply it to the 
incarcerated. The Dignity Act currently is silent on whether the Act covers the incarcerated.6 It is 
understood that when one is sent to prison, they lose certain liberties and freedoms afforded to 
law-abiding citizens. Like for instance, the right to vote. Losing that right is much different than 
not having a say over your bodily autonomy. While nine states have enacted parallel “death with 
dignity” statutes, this paper will focus on Oregon’s dying with dignity statute due to its place in 
right to die history, as the first state to have such legislation, as well as the constant battle the 
state has had over prisoner well-being.  
This paper will proceed as follows.  First, this paper will identify the problems of aging in 
prison. Next, it will discuss what death with dignity is and the details of Oregon’s Dignity Act. 
Afterwards, distinguishing the constitutional rights afforded to prisoners and then balancing the 
states interests with the rights afforded to the incarcerated.  The discussion of prison and the role 
that healthcare plays in the prison system will inform how the Act will apply to the incarcerated. 
Last, suggested legislation for addressing the incarcerated and their access to the Dignity Act.  
Dying and Aging in Prison 
 

















Figure 1. The growth of older 









There exists a term called the “silver tsunami,”7 that reflects how the surging numbers of 
elderly inmates8  raises significant moral, health, and fiscal implications deserving keen scrutiny. 
Prisoners are getting older and constitute an obvious population for potential early release. This 
“national human-made epidemic,”9 is growing at a rapid rate and needs to be addressed. An 
aging inmate population—in part due to extended sentences—is one of the main drivers of 
increased cost of medical care in state prison systems. Looking at Figure 210 above, Oregon has 
one of the largest percentages of prisoners over the age of 55. Prisoners over the age of fifty 50 
are the fastest growing population.11 Research has even shown that those in prison age faster than 
those of the same age who are not in prison.12 The cost of caring for these elderly inmates is five 
 
7 Martina E. Cartwright, The Silver Tsunami: Aging Prisoners, Early Release, Guardianship and Prisoner Advocate 
Initiatives for Long Term Care Beyond the Prison Walls, 1 TOURO L. CTR. J. AGING, LONGEVITY, L., & POL'Y 
54, 54 (2016), available 
8 Matt McKillop & Alex Boucher, Aging Prison Populations Drive Up Costs | The Pew Charitable Trusts (2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/02/20/aging-prison-populations-drive-up-costs. 
at https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jallp [https://perma.cc/CB59-
65WG]; see OSBORNE ASS'N, THE HIGH COSTS OF LOW RISK: THE CRISIS OF 
AMERICA'S AGING PRISON POPULATION 2 (Jul. 2014), available at http://www.osborneny.org/news/unite-
for-parole-and-prison-justice/osborne-aging-whitepaper/ [https://perma.cc/7S8N-A3BP]. 
9 OSBORNE ASS'N, supra note 7, at 2; see also Matthew Clarke, Report Finds Fiscal Crisis of Increasing Low-
Risk, High-Cost Older Prisoners, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Aug. 4, 
2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/aug/4/report-finds-fiscal-crisis-increasing-low-risk-high-cost-
older-prisoners/ [https://perma.cc/Z3YF-RY2U] (reacting to the Osborne Association report). 
10  
11 Sari Horwitz, The Painful Price of Aging in Prison, WASH. POST (May 2, 
2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/05/02/the-painful-price-of-aging-in-
prison/?utm_term=.4ffdcb077191 [http://perma.cc/F7DE-JFES]. 
12 Brie A. Williams, et al., Aging in Correctional Custody: Setting a Policy Agenda for Older Prisoner Health Care, 
102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1475, 1477 (2012). 
Figure 3 
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times greater in states with the greatest elderly population compared to those with the least 
amount of elderly inmates.13 Prisoners have significantly higher rates of physical and mental 
illness than the general population14 - including higher rates of communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS,15  Hepatitis B and C,16 chronic diseases,  and mental illness. Illness related deaths 
account for majority of the deaths among prisoners. Terminally ill diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
and Dementia are prevalent among people 65 and older.17 Among those 55 and older, they are 
the most susceptible to these illnesses and in turn are the age group with the most deaths, dying 
from illnesses and diseases (heart, liver, and respiratory).18 Those in prison who fall within this 
age gap should be allowed to make use of the Dignity Act.  
There are prisoners who are not elderly who also may succumb to terminal illness 
mentioned above. Enabling them to access the Act will prove helpful as well. Allowing anyone 
 
13 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE 
POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2, at ii, 51. (May 
2015), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf. 
14 See John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 447, 450 
(2005) ("'The prevalence of chronic illness, communicable diseases, and severe mental disorders among people in 
jail and prison is far greater than among other people of comparable ages.'" (quoting The Report of the Re-Entry 
Policy Council: Charting the Safe and Successful Return of Prisoners to the Community 157 (2005))); Adrienne 
Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 
Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 259, 297-98 (2009) ("The prevalence of certain infectious diseases, substance abuse 
problems, and mental health disorders is significantly greater in inmate populations than in the general American 
population." (footnotes omitted)); Harold Pollack et al., Health Care Delivery Strategies for Criminal Offenders, 26 
J. Health Care Fin. 63, 65 (1999) (describing how the prison population suffers from a "prevalence of mental health 
problems, infectious diseases, substance abuse, and other morbidities"); Michele Westhoff, An Examination 
of Prisoners' Constitutional Right to Healthcare: Theory and Practice, Health Law, Aug. 2008, at 1, 8-9 (noting the 
high rates of communicable diseases, substance abuse disorders, and mental illness in prison). 
15 A 2003 Department of Justice study found that 22,028 state inmates and 1631 federal inmates were infected with 
HIV, accounting for "1.1% of all federal inmates and 2.0% of state inmates, or 1.9% of the entire prison population 
in the United States." Kari Larsen, Deliberately Indifferent: Government Response to HIV in U.S. Prisons, 24 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 251, 251 (2008). The report also found that the rates of HIV varied significantly from 
state to state. In New York, for example, 7.6% of state prisoners were HIV positive. Id. 
16 Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C are grossly overrepresented in the prison population, with rates nine to ten times the 
national average. Westhoff, supra note 4, at 8. 
17 https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/about-dementia/types-dementia/who-gets-alzheimers-disease 
18 Margaret Noonan, Mortality in State Prisons, 2001-2014 - Statistical Tables, Table 10 (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msp0114st.pdf. (See Figure 3.). 
 6 
who is terminally ill to make the choice to end their life with dignity will relieve the burden of an 
overcrowded prison situation and help to maintain balance.  
 
Death with Dignity Act 
 
Death with Dignity allows a person the opportunity to meet their ends quickly and 
painlessly, as an alternative to the long and painful process they would otherwise endure. 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act enumerates the conditions patients and physicians must satisfy 
in order to take advantage of physician-assisted dying: the patient must be (1) an adult who is 
capable; (2) a resident of Oregon; and (3) diagnosed with a terminal illness.19 There are many 
procedural safeguards contained within the legislation: the person seeking aid-in-dying 
medication must make three separate requests for medication for the purpose of ending his or her 
life, one written and two oral, to their attending physician, and the oral requests must be made 
fifteen days apart, the second reiterating the oral request to the physician.20 The written request 
has to “be signed and dated, in front of at least two witnesses . . . .”21 Then a consulting 
physician must examine the patient and his or her relevant medical records and confirm, in 
writing, the prior diagnosis of a terminal condition by the attending physician is accurate, and 
verify that the patient is capable, acting voluntarily and made a fully informed decision with 
awareness of other options.22 If during the course of this process either physician believes that a 
 
19 Id. § 127.805 s.2.01. 
20 Id. § 127.840 s.3.06.  
21 Id. § 127.810 s.2.02. 
22 Id. § 127.820 s.3.02. 
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patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression that will 
cause judgments to be impaired, either physician must refer the patient for counseling.23 
The Dignity Act requires that the medical records contain the diagnosis and prognosis 
made by both physicians, all oral and written requests, the attending physician and consulting 
physician’s diagnosis and prognosis and notes on capacity, and outcome and determinations 
made during counseling, if performed.24 Even after going through the process, an individual can 
still make the decision to not take the medication.25 However, they must self-administer the 
prescription if they do choose to follow through. This thorough legislation did not come 
overnight. It took years to develop and the history of right to die made it all possible.  
 
History of “Right to Die” 
 
The right to die is not constitutional. It is the state’s choice to give their residents this 
option. Since Oregon allows this, the history of the right to die is imperative in developing an 
analysis that would explain why applying this to prisoners should be considered and 
implemented. In 1983, the right to die clash took the nation by storm when the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.26 In Cruzan, Nancy was 
driving down the road when she lost control of the vehicle; the car toppled over, leaving her in a 
“persistent vegetative state,” with severe injuries, including brain damage.27 Nancy’s husband 
 
23 Id. § 127.825 s.3.03. 
24 Id. § 127.855 s.3.09. 
25 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.845 s.3.07. 
26 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the guardian of a young 
woman who was not competent had the legal right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment).  
27 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.  
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consented to the initial insertion of feeding and hydration tubes.28 Years later, Nancy’s co-
guardians requested a court order that the hospital to discontinue this life-sustaining treatment. 
The state hospital refused to remove the tubes. It demanded court approval, which was granted 
by the Missouri trial court.29 The Supreme Court of the United States held that because the state 
has  a legitimate interest in preservation of life,30 its requirement of clear and convincing 
evidence that Nancy would have wanted the discontinuation of nutrition and hydration was not 
unconstitutional.31. This constitutional decision stated that there is a “liberty interest” that 
individuals possess that stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, that guarantees freedom from unwanted 
touching. This freedom is meant to include that of unwanted medical treatment, even if it is life-
sustaining.32 This constitutional decision was the first step towards a one of the most 
controversial topics.  
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a statute which prohibited 
physician assisted suicide, finding that the state, in enacting the statute, was properly motivated 
by the four legitimate interests mentioned in Thor.33  The Court also stated in dicta that states 
could choose, if they so wanted, to pass legislation allowing physician-assisted suicide. 
The SCOTUS decision opened the gates for states to make their own legislation. In 
Oregon, although the first state to enact such legislation, they were met with opposition the same 
 
28 Id. at 266–68. 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997); Thor, 855 P.2d at 382 (“Four state interests generally identify the countervailing 
considerations in determining the scope of patient autonomy: preserving life, preventing suicide, maintaining the 
integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties."). 
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year of their enactment of the Dignity Act in 1994 with Lee v. Oregon.34 The plaintiffs here 
included physicians, four terminally ill or potentially terminally ill patients, a residential care 
facility, and individual operators of residential care facilities.35 The Oregon Death With Dignity 
Act (Measure 16) was challenged in the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that it violated the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, statutory and First 
Amendment rights of freedom to exercise religion and to associate, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. The court determined that “Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide to a 
severely overinclusive class who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused 
by others.”36 The court held that the state interest was not rationally related to the disparate 
treatment, meaning the Dignity Act was unconstitutional.37  
 
Prison and Healthcare 
It is the Eighth Amendment that governs prison healthcare. The United States 
Constitution, by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, interpreted this amendment to require 
prisons to provide a minimum level of care for prisoners.38 Currently in 2019, there are around 
1,306,000 people serving sentences in state prisons within the United States.39 These inmates 
account for about 57% of the total prison population of 2.3 million.40 Healthcare is expensive 
and for inmates the cost of providing healthcare is increased. The factors that contribute to the 
increased costs are the “[p]revalence of infectious and chronic diseases, mental illness, and 
 
34 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Ore. 1995). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1437. 
37 Id. 
38 NOTE: PRISON HEALTH CARE AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: ENVISIONING AN END TO THE 
POLICY OF NEGLECT, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 719. 




substance abuse among inmates, many of whom enter prisons with these problems.” 41 The 
location of prisons plays a role in the situation as well. Prisons are not near hospitals and other 
providers, making it harder to provide emergency services.42 
In Estelle v. Gamble,43 the SCOTUS addressed the constitutional standard for medical 
treatment in the prison system. Gamble was an inmate who was denied prescribed treatment by 
guards, sent to solitary confinement, and put before the prison disciplinary committee.44 The 
Court held that under the Eighth Amendment, it is unconstitutional if there is an indifference to 
the serious medical needs of the prisoner “whether the indifference is manifested by prison 
doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs45 or by prison guards in intentionally denying or 
delaying access to medical care46or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. 
The Court found, in dicta, that the government has an "obligation to provide medical care for 
those whom it is punishing by incarceration."47 Prisoners are unable to freely obtain the medical 
attention they need so the State is obligated to pay for it.48 
 
41 Pew Charitable Tr., Managing Prison Health Care Spending supra note 29, at 4, 8. 
 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/ 
2014/pctcorrectionshealthcarebrief050814pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3XM2YCX]. 
42 Id.  
43 429 U.S. 97 (1976).  
44 Id. at 101. 
45 Id. at 104-05. See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1974)(doctor's choosing the "easier and less 
efficacious treatment" of throwing away the prisoner's ear and stitching the stump may be attributable to "deliberate 
indifference… rather than an exercise of professional judgment"); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7), cert. 
denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was 
allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973) (refusal of 
paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 
(1971) (prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by 
requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon). 
46 Id. See, e.g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F. 2d 857 (CA6 1976); Thomas v. Pate, supra, at 158-
159; Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F. 2d 1072 (CA6 1972); Hutchens v. Alabama, 466 F. 2d 507 (CA5 
1972); Riley v. Rhay, 407 F. 2d 496 (CA9 1969); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F. 2d 993 (CA4 
1966); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F. 2d 495 (CA5 1961). 
 
47 Id. at 130. 
48 See generally Jeffrey Natterman & Pamela Rayne, The Prisoner in a Private Hospital Setting: What Providers 
Should Know, 19 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 119, 126 (2016) (“A prisoner, by definition, is not free to seek 
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In Wilson v. Seiter,49  the Supreme Court held that the deliberate indifference standard 
applies to all cases challenging conditions of confinement and defined acting with "deliberate 
indifference" as acting with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind."50   In Farmer v. Brennan, the 
Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of the term.51   The petitioner argued that deliberate 
indifference was based on the objective standard for civil suits, but the Supreme Court rejected 
that argument.52 The Court instead held that liability for a prison official under the Eighth 
Amendment for inhumane conditions of confinement is when the "official must both be aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 
he must also draw the inference."53 Though the Court did not clearly define the term in Gamble, 
it did provide some guidance. After reasoning that prisons were responsible for providing 
medical care because prisoners could not get care on their own, Justice Marshall wrote, "In the 
worst cases, such a failure [to provide medical care] may actually produce physical 'torture or a 
lingering death,' …. In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering 
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose."54 
Some prisons contract physicians and although not directly working for the State, there 
still exists a standard of care that must be met. In West v. Atkins,55 the Court held that 
“contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to 
 
treatment for serious medical conditions that may be . . . extremely painful. Allowing a prisoner to suffer with a . . . 
medical condition that the prisoner cannot address on his own due to confinement imposed by the state could result 
in liability for the state under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
49 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
50 Id. at 298. 
51 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Farmer was a conditions of confinement case. However, its treatment of the "deliberate 
indifference" standard is still relevant to cases that involve medical care because, after Wilson, all conditions of 
confinement cases use the "deliberate indifference" standard. 
52 Id. at 837. 
53 Id. 
54 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
 
55 487 U.S. 42 
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provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's 
prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.”56 
 Some courts say that prisoners have a “paramount” liberty interest in privacy and bodily 
integrity, while others, despite finding a liberty interest, allow prison officials to force medical 
treatment.57 The State interests in maintaining prison order and security can at times outweigh 
the liberty interest of the prisoner.58 Even when a healthy prisoner threatens these state interests, 
they can be subject to state intervention.59 The groundbreaking case discussing this is 
Commissioner of Corrections  v. Myers.60 
Mr. Myers acquired a kidney disease that involved hemodialysis during his time at a correctional 
facility in Massachusetts.61 His death would stem from a mixture of not receiving dialysis and his 
refusal to ingest required medication.62 Given this information it would be correct to say that the 
medication and dialysis are life-saving treatments. It was after a year that Myers decided to reject 
the scheduled treatment.63  
 
56 As the dissent in the Court of Appeals explained, if this were the basis for delimiting § 1983 liability, "the state 
will be free to contract out all services which it is constitutionally obligated to provide and leave its citizens with no 
means for vindication of those rights, whose protection has been delegated to 'private' actors, when they have been 
denied." 815 F. 2d, at 998. 
57 COMMENT: DEATH WITH DIGNITY FOR THE SEEMINGLY UNDIGNIFIED: DENIAL OF AID IN DYING 
IN PRISON, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 648 
58 In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984); Lantz v. Coleman, 978 A.2d 164, 169 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008); (“The 
defendant did not completely forfeit his State constitutional right to privacy by reason of his incarceration, but rather 
subjected himself to State interests unique to the prison.”). See also State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 
358, 360 (N.D. 1995) (holding that a prison could force a diabetic inmate to take insulin where he was refusing in an 
effort to manipulate and blackmail the prison).  
59 Id. at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the testimony of the prison doctor as to how the inmate was forcibly 
fed through a tube that “passed down through the nasal passages into the stomach . . ..”).  
60 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979). 
61 Id. at 453. Hemodialysis is a procedure whereby blood is pumped out of the body, cleansed of its toxins, and then 
returned to the body in addition to being prescribed medication that would lower the defendant's blood potassium 
level. Id. 




Following this action by Myers, the Commissioner of Correction brought suit in the 
Superior Court, for a declaratory judgment that would allow him to compel Myers to undergo the 
treatment he was previously doing.64 The Court went over a few possibilities for why Myers 
refused treatment such as the effects of the treatment, religious objections, or a general desire to 
die and ultimately discovered it was a way of him protesting against being placed in a medium 
instead of a minimum-security prison.65 Among the considerations the superior court examined 
were the amount of pain Myers would endure from dialysis, where he was on the kidney 
transplant list, and how old he was. After examining these aspects, the court determined he 
would be able to live a normal life.66 The court recognized precedent that there is a strong 
interest in being free from a non-consensual invasion of bodily integrity that a person in addition 
to a constitutional privacy right in preventing unwanted medical treatment.67 The Court balanced 
the prison’s interest in “upholding orderly prison administration” against the constitutional right 
of Mr. Myers. The former outweighed the latter.68 The Court recognized that although 
"incarceration d[id] not per se divest him of his right to privacy and interest in bodily integrity, it 
d[id] impose limitations on those constitutional rights in terms of the State interests unique to 
the prison context."69 The Court upheld the appeals court’s decision that prison officials can use 
“reasonable force” to restrain Mr. Myers during his dialysis and other life-saving treatment.70  
 
64Id. at 453. 
65 Id. at 454. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 455-56.  
68 Id. at 457. The Commissioner argued that preservation of the prison's internal order and discipline and 
maintaining institutional security was what the prison had an interest in. Id. He argued "the maintenance of proper 
discipline and supervision of inmates "mandate[d] an authority to administer life-saving medical treatment without 
consent" and the prison's failure to prevent the prisoner defendant's death would pose a "serious threat" to prison 
order by possibly triggering an "explosive" reaction among other inmates and encouraging other inmates to attempt 
similar forms of coercion in order to "attain illegitimate ends." Id. 
 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 453, 457-58. 
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Washington v. Harper changed the precedent for state courts. Before 1990 courts had a 
fairly unrestricted freedom in determining when a prisoner was forced to undergo medical 
treatment.71 After serving a sentence at Washington State Penitentiary from 1976-1980, Mr. 
Walker Harper was diagnosed with manic-depressive disorder and housed in a special 
correctional institute that diagnosed and treated prisoners with serious mental health 
illnesses.72 Under Policy 600.30 a person may be involuntarily treated with medication “if the 
person (1) suffers from a "mental disorder" and (2) is "gravely disabled" or poses a "likelihood of 
serious harm" to himself, others, or their property.”73 
Walker said yes to the treatment at first but then refused to continue the medication.74 In 
an effort to medicate Mr. Harper despite his refusing treatment, a committee held a hearing with 
Mr. Harper present that concluded he was a danger to others as a result of a mental illness, and 
approved the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.75 A few years later Mr. Harper 
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 198376 claiming that his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
 
71 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
72 Id.  
73 The Policy's definitions of the terms "mental disorder," "gravely disabled," and "likelihood of serious harm" are 
identical to the definitions of the terms as they are used in the state involuntary commitment statute. See App. to Pet. 
for Cert. B-3. "Mental disorder" means "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse 
effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions." Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.020(2) (1987). "Gravely 
disabled" means "a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) is in danger of serious physical 
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe 
deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over 
his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety." § 71.05.020(1). 
"Likelihood of serious harm" means "either: (a) [a] substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an 
individual upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on 
one's self, (b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evidenced by 
behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining 
such harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon the property of others, 
as evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others." § 71.05.020(3). 
74 Harper at 214.  
75 Id. at 217.  
 
76 § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights- Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
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Due Process was violated because the committee failed to provide a hearing 
before prison officials administered his drugs without his consent.77 The Supreme Court of the 
United States acknowledged that Harper had a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause."78  In addition, 
they found that “[t]he extent of a prisoner's right under the Clause to avoid unwanted [medical 
treatment] must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement."79 The Court, using the 
decision in Turner v. Safley,80 which established the standard of review for constitutional claims 
brought by prisoners.81  The Turner precedent articulated the Due Process Clause 
warrants prison officials to "treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with 
antipsychotic drugs against his will."82   
The standards and resources available for those in prison compared to those who are not 
is clear. There are rights that people who do not spend their time behind bars have available to 
them that those that do, although may be recognized, still may not invoke. Bodily autonomy is 
not something that prisoners have full control over if the interest of the state is more important. 
This is a drastic difference from Cruzan, finding a competent person has the liberty to refuse 
medical care.  
 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 221-22. 
79 Id. 
80 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Turner established that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, 
the regulation is valid if it reasonably relates to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 89. The reasonability of a 
prison regulation is governed by several factors: (1) a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the 
purported legitimate interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that are an avenue by 
which the prisoner can exercise his asserted right; (3) the impact that the accommodation will have on the prison 
community and institutional resources; and (4) "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness 
of a prison regulation.” Id. at 89-90. 
81 Id. at 223-24. 
82 Id. at 227.  
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An incarcerated individual's inability to refuse medical treatment highlights a case where 
courts treat prisoners' autonomy different than non-incarcerated individuals. The ability 
of prison officials to force feed inmates is also demonstrates how courts treat incarcerated and 
nonincarcerated individuals' autonomy differently. Based on the holding in Cruzan--that a 
competent person has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in withdrawing medical care--
prisoners should be able to starve themselves under the Fourteenth Amendment and autonomy 
principles.83  Notwithstanding a ruling by the Supreme Court weighing in on a constitutional 
right to starve, several state court cases are informative on the issue. Cases involving prisoners’ 
refusal to eat help elucidate the expanse of prisoners’ constitutional rights as weighed against the 
state’s interests. 
In Zant v. Prevatte,84  Mr. Prevatte, as a form of protest, decided to stop eating.85 After 
about a month the doctors opined that Mr. Prevatte would not live longer than three weeks if he 
did not receive nutrition.86  The State believed it had a “duty to protect the health of those who 
are incarcerated in the state penal system; and that there is a compelling state interest to preserve 
human life.”87 In disagreeing, The Supreme Court of Georgia held that a competent prisoner, 
with no dependents, maintained a right to privacy and therefore the State could not override his 
decision to starve, even though feeding would likely save his life.88 The Supreme Court of 
 
83 See generally Silver, supra note 89, at 632, 661 (arguing that "force-feeding a competent inmate necessarily 
violates that inmate's fundamental privacy rights" and the right to starve "should not be affected by a prisoner's 
incarcerated status. It should not be contingent on a prisoner's physical state. And it should not be conditioned on the 
purpose of a hunger strike."). 
84 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. Ketosis is a normal metabolic process. When the body does not have enough glucose for energy, it burns 
stored fats instead; this results in a build-up of acids called ketones within the body. 
87 Id. 
 
88 Id. at 717. 
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Georgia was one of many other courts who held this standard.89 Other states have refused to 
recognize a protected liberty interest in the right to starve.90   
Oregon cases contribute to our analysis as well. Atiyeh v. Capps addressed the 
relationship between healthcare and prison population in terms of proper medical care.91 The 
district court found that the overcrowding in prison "exceeds the level of applicable professional 
standards; has increased the health risks to which inmates are exposed; has impinged on the 
proper delivery of medical and mental health care;  has reduced the opportunity for inmates to 
participate in rehabilitative programs; has resulted in idleness; has produced an atmosphere of 
tension and fear among inmates and staff; and has reduced the ability of the institutions to protect 
the inmates from assaults.”92 Although freedom from overcrowding is not a constitutional right, 
it leads to inadequate healthcare which is. 
The cases discussed above as well as those being discussed below address prisoners’ 
access to healthcare and suggest that there is a level of care prisoners should have, driven by the 
Constitution and that a competent prisoner who chooses to refuse food and treatment should be 
allowed to do so. The Supreme Court of California in Thor v. Superior Ct.,93 held that an 
informed prisoner (Andrews)  possessed a fundamental right to deny or demand retraction of 
medical treatment of any kind, despite the risk of mortality, which normally outweighed any 
countervailing state interest.94 The State argued that Andrews did not possess the same degree of 
debilitation of others which chronic pain and dependence made life hopeless and "intolerable," 
 
89 Id. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377 (376 NE2d 1232) (1978); In Re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282 
(383 A2d 785) (1978); In Re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619 (1973). See in general 93 ALR3d 67, anno. 
90  See also Comm'r of Corr. V. Coleman, 38 A.3d 84 (Conn. 2012); McNabb v. Dep't of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257 
(Wash. 2008) (en banc). 
91 449 U.S. 1312 (1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894 (holding the milk pasteurization process and fire alarm 
system were constitutional deficiency in the provision of medical care.) 
92 Id. at 1350. 
93 5 Cal. 4th 725 (Cal. 1993).  
94 Id. at 749. 
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constituting a proportionately smaller measure of control over bodily intrusions.95 The court 
found the argument “misapprehends the intensely individual nature and broadly based scope of 
the right to personal autonomy, which simply will not accommodate the kind of parsing 
petitioner invites.96 It is the individual who must live or die with the course of treatment chosen 
or rejected, not the state.97 
In Billings v. Gates98  Billings sought relief from the pain he suffered as a result of high 
arches that were not accommodated by the shoes he was provided, causing enough pain to keep 
him from walking.99 The State argued that under Gamble, Billings was receiving 
“constitutionally adequate” care and should be denied relief.100The Oregon Supreme Court 
concluded that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, whether the indifference is manifested 
by prison doctors in their response to a prisoner's serious medical needs or by prison guards in 
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care, or in intentionally interfering with 
prescribed treatment.101 Delker v. Maass,102 utilized the deliberate indifference standard as 
well.103 Delker had an inguinal hernia that was never taken care of because it was deemed not an 
emergency according to the physician he went to see while incarcerated.104 Despite being told he 
was on a waiting list for surgery, plaintiff continued to state how he was in pain and continued to 
 
95 Id. at 741. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 323 Or. 167 (1996). 
99 Id. at 169. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 181. That claim is comparable to others that we have held were legally sufficient. See, e.g., Voth v. 
Maass, 120 Ore. App. 574, 852 P.2d 969 (1993) (foot problem aggravated by defendant's confiscation of prescribed 
orthopedic footwear and refusal to provide replacement footwear); Jorgenson v. Schiedler, supra (edema in ankles). 
102 843 F. Supp. 1390, 1398 (D. Or. 1994) 
103 Id. at 1401.  
 
104 Id. at 1393-95. 
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receive no treatment.105 The State and prison officials made two assertions: 1. The court cannot 
question a professional medical opinion, and 2. the Eighth Amendment duty to provide medical 
care is limited to conditions that are life-threatening or will cause permanent disability.106 The 
court in Thor found that while precedent before and after Cruzan acknowledged a right to forgo 
medical treatment, that right is qualified by four state interests: “preserving life, preventing 
suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third 
parties.”107 None of these interests applied to this case.108The court held that defendant was 
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's complaints of pain and restricted capacity, and his obvious 
anxiety. This indifference resulted in the unnecessary infliction of pain, suffering, and anxiety 
upon plaintiff. Plaintiff has established the necessary elements of his claim and is entitled to 
prevail.109 
We must examine the role of prison healthcare when discussing how aiding in dying and 
incarceration work. The standards as discussed above vary. The prison system cannot be 
wrangled into one category because the way that states proportion the resources for prisons 
differ. Regardless, the standard developed by the Eighth Amendment stays the same throughout.  
 
Death with Dignity for Oregon Prisoners 
 
105 Id. (“An inguinal hernia occurs when there is a small opening in the lining of the abdominal wall, and part of the 
intestine pokes through this hole. A hernia is "easily reducible" if, when the peritoneum bulges through the outer 
abdominal wall, the patient can restore the hernia sac to its proper position without the assistance of a doctor by 
either pressing on the sac or laying down. An inguinal hernia can become acutely incarcerated. An acutely 
incarcerated hernia that is not treated within 6 to 8 hours may become strangulated (i.e., the intestinal loop 
protruding through the abdominal wall becomes constricted), a condition that may result in serious injury or even 
death. An acutely incarcerated hernia also causes severe pain. Even an unincarcerated hernia can cause pain and 
limit activity in some patients.”) 
106 Id. at 1398. 
107 Id. at 382 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d. 1127, 1142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Brophy v. New 
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985)).  
108 Id. at 384. Interestingly, the court in Thor stated, in dicta, that “the state has expressed a limited interest at best 
[in preventing suicide] since it imposes no criminal or civil sanction for intentional acts of self-destruction.” Id. at 
385.  
109 Id. at 1401. 
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Overcrowding is still an issue in Oregon prisons today.110 This is an issue that does not 
seem to be relieved anytime soon.111 Over 700 inmates were released earlier due to 
overcrowding.112 When prisoners are released most of them lack the resources to be able to fend 
for themselves. Oregon is one such state that  releases terminally ill prisoners from prison and 
lets someone else handle it, whether it be a hospital or family member.113 Although Oregon State 
Penitentiary does have a hospice program for men,114this hospice care does not offer death with 
dignity services,115 just palliative care for  inmates who are suffering from serious illnesses.116  
The cases above demonstrate that prisoners have a right to proper medical care, a liberty 
interest, and a right to privacy established in the Constitution. Implicit amongst these rights 
should be the right to die with dignity. Oregon should also inform prisoners who are suffering 
from terminal illnesses of the option to utilize the Dignity Act as an alternative end of life 
treatment. However, since inmates are a vulnerable population due to the lack of sufficient 
medical care there needs to be additional safeguards for them. For instance, Prisoners with 
mental health issues may not be the best candidates for death with dignity. Many prisoners enter 
prison with mental health issues and others develop mental health issues as a result of prison life. 
117 Severe mental health disorders are more prevalent among the prison population versus the 
 





113 B. Jaye Anno, Ph.D., C.C.H.P.–A. et al., U.S. Department of Justice, Addressing the Needs of Elderly, 
Chronically Ill, and Terminally Ill Inmates (2004). 
114 Id. at 38. They do have criteria for the hospice program. 
115 Id. at 39. The only criteria for receiving hospice care are that two practitioners must have determined that the 
inmate has less than a year to live and that the inmate elects to receive hospice services. The inmate’s diagnosis, 
level of functioning, and type of crime are not considered.  
116 Id. 
117 Linda A. Teplin, Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Disorders Among Male Urban Jail Detainees, 84 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 290, 292 (1994) [hereinafter Teplin, Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Disorders]. 
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general, non-incarcerated population.118 Studies have shown that 7.2% of the jail population has 
a serious mental disorder.119Prolonged lengths of incarceration in correctional settings aggravate 
the mental and physical health of inmates with severe mental disorders even further and render 
both treatment and adjudication virtually indefinite.120 This means that they will constantly be 
undergoing treatment until they die. This increases costs for the state institutions that could be 
avoided if inmates were given the option to end their life pursuant to the Dignity Act.  
The Dignity Act already lays out the steps for prisoners to access life ending medication.  
Oregon’s Dignity Act already has in place, a clause that allows physicians to refer a person to 
psychological or psychiatric counseling if they deem necessary.121 Due to the lack of sufficient 
care in prison systems additional safeguards just need to be in place so that the fully informed 
decision that is required is actually one sufficient to qualify for the medication. There should be a 
mandatory counseling session for any prisoner choosing to access the Dignity Act.  
Conclusion 
Allowing the incarcerated to die with dignity will not only aid in overall prison healthcare 
but will also help to maintain the prison population. The prison system has not always been kind 
to those they must protect. Giving them the option to die with dignity will give them autonomy 
over their bodies as well as allowing for individuals who are facing terminal illnesses in prison to 
be able to end their life. This will also alleviate some of the issues that come with overcrowding, 
freeing up the prison population.  
 
118 Ron Jemelka et al., The Mentally Ill in Prisons, 40 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 481, 486 (1989). 
119 E. Fuller Torrey et al., Criminalizing the Seriously Mentally Ill: The Abuse of Jails as Mental Hospitals 13 
(1992). The survey represented 41% of all U.S. jails and 60% of all jail inmates. The survey defined a serious 
mental illness as schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, and related conditions. Id. at 14. 
120 Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional Facilities, 22 Bull. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry L. 621, 626 (1994). 
121 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.825 s.3.03. 
